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 Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from
 the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisionst
 By Katja Seim and Joel Waldfogel*
 We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of
 government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of
 the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly
 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and
 lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the
 number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system
 is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing.
 Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's
 bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of politi
 cal influence on entry. (JEL D42, D72, LI 1, L12, L43, L81)
 An economic system can leave entry decisions to markets or to government.
 Markets have many well-known advantages, along with some well-understood
 challenges. For example, private action can result in insufficient entry when ben
 efits cover costs but revenue does not; and private entry can lead to excessive entry
 when revenue covers the cost of an additional outlet even though the incremental
 social benefit does not. Moreover, even if the number of outlets is fixed at the cor
 rect level, private entry can result in the choice of suboptimal locations, as in the
 well-known Hotelling two-firm result (Hotelling 1929). A planner can, in prin
 ciple, avoid these problems if he internalizes business stealing effects while also
 attaching a benefit to consumer surplus. But even such a planner's entry decisions
 may face challenges. Government-controlled entities can be captured politically
 and may allocate resources to serve political ends rather than to promote economic
 efficiency. For example, labor costs may be higher if union labor is favored; and
 store location decisions might be subject to political pressure.
 It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency and apparent motives of centralized entry
 decisions because few contexts allow for direct comparison of government and
 market entry patterns. One exception is liquor retailing in the United States. Since
 Prohibition, liquor distribution has been heavily regulated by state and local gov
 ernments, each of which has chosen its own regulatory path. The 50 US states are
 divided broadly into 2 allocative camps: 32 "private" or "open" states where the
 *Seim: Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust
 Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: kseim@wharton.upenn.edu); Waldfogel: Carlson School of Management,
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 number of stores operating is generally regulated but operators are free to choose
 particular locations, and 18 "control" states, where the government has a monop
 oly on liquor retailing, wholesaling, or both. In Pennsylvania, all stores are both
 controlled and operated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB), with
 unionized government employees.
 This paper studies entry decisions made by the PLCB with the goal of addressing
 two questions, one positive and one normative. First, how does allocation by a gov
 ernment monopoly affect outcomes? That is, how do store configurations and result
 ing welfare under the PLCB compare with plausible private alternatives? Second,
 what implicit motives underlie the government-operated system? This second ques
 tion has three parts: (i) How closely does its operation conform to the theoretical
 benchmarks of free entry, or profit or welfare maximization? (ii) What do PLCB
 entry patterns reveal about the government's attitude toward different types of con
 sumers? and (iii) Is there evidence of political influence?1
 We explore these questions in six sections. Section I presents background on
 liquor retailing and, in particular, a comparison of the systems in private and control
 states. Two facts about the PLCB are clear from this comparison: relative to private
 states, Pennsylvania has higher store operation costs and operates far fewer stores
 per capita. Section II describes the data used for estimation. Section III presents a
 model of spatial demand that we use to calculate the quantities sold at each store
 location, as well as consumer and producer surplus in each location, for any con
 figuration of stores. Section III also describes how we use the model to calculate
 various counterfactual store configurations, including free entry as well as efficient
 configurations that maximize welfare or profit.
 We then use the modeling to answer two sets of substantive questions. Section IV
 presents a comparison of the current system with free entry simulations to describe
 the private system Pennsylvania would have absent the PLCB. We find that the wel
 fare impact of the PLCB is to reduce consumer surplus and raise producer surplus,
 much of which is shared with labor under the current system. Section V provides
 evidence on motives underlying the PLCB's store configuration. We use our model
 to characterize a continuum of "efficient" store configurations that maximize a
 weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus 7r 4- 7CS. Viewed against theoreti
 cal benchmarks of profit maximization (7 = 0) and welfare maximization (7 = 1),
 we find that the current system has just over half the number of stores that would
 maximize welfare if the state faced competitive labor costs. Instead, the PLCB sys
 tem resembles profit maximization with labor profit sharing, or welfare maximiza
 tion, given a constraint of paying supercompetitive labor costs. The PLCB system
 mitigates a bias against rural consumers that would prevail under free entry. We see
 only limited evidence of political influence on store location decisions. Section VI
 concludes with a discussion of the likely effects of the PLCB on aggregate welfare.
 'Our work has similarities with recent studies of store entry decisions by big-box retail chains (see, e.g., Jia
 2008 and Holmes 2011). In contrast to these settings, where static or dynamic profit maximization appears a natural
 objective for the firms, this is less apparent in the context of a public enteiprise. See, for example, Boardman and
 Vining (1989) for a prominent study comparing the efficiency of private and public enterprises.
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 I. Liquor Distribution in Pennsylvania versus Other States
 Pennsylvania is at an extreme among control states, acting as a state monopo
 list in the wholesale and retail distribution of wine and liquor through a system
 of state-run stores staffed by unionized government employees. Pennsylvania has
 a private system for the sale of beer, which is sold by the case in licensed private
 "beer distributors" and by the six-pack at bars and restaurants. By contrast, some of
 the control states, like Ohio and Maine, contract with private firms to operate retail
 stores on the state's behalf. In others, such as Utah and Washington, the state oper
 ates some stores, while private licensees operate others. Private states, on the other
 hand, employ regulated private entry, allowing fully private retailing operations but
 limiting the supply of licenses, generally within each municipality. This section
 compares Pennsylvania to other control and private states along several dimensions,
 including number of stores and their workforce, liquor taxes, pricing and selection
 at stores, and consumption per capita.
 A. Entry in Control and Private States
 Since private states do not have unregulated free entry, but typically award a lim
 ited number of liquor store licenses, it is not clear a priori that a private system
 in Pennsylvania would have more or fewer stores than the government system. In
 principle, a comparison of the number of liquor stores in control and private states
 for any given level of demand is easy. The 2007 Economic Census provides data on
 the number of stores selling beer, wine, and liquor in each state; and the 2000 census
 provides data on population, which provides a reasonable proxy for demand. There
 are a few complications, however. First, many states allow the sale of alcoholic
 beverages in grocery stores; such states will have fewer stand-alone liquor stores
 per capita. Using the 2007 Economic Census data on sales by line of business, we
 can calculate the share of packaged alcoholic beverage sales occurring in dedicated
 liquor stores (a). If N is the number of liquor stores, N/a is an approximation of the
 number of liquor stores if all packaged liquor demand were satisfied by dedicated
 liquor stores. Second, unlike liquor stores elsewhere, PLCB stores sell only wine
 and spirits (and not beer), depressing the number of PLCB outlets relative to popu
 lation. The Economic Census product line data indicate that 35 percent of packaged
 liquor sales in Pennsylvania are beer, so we adjust the number of PLCB stores by
 scaling by (1/0.65). Figure 1 plots the resulting adjusted number of liquor stores
 against population in log terms.
 As of the first week of 2005, Pennsylvania operated 621 wine and spirits stores,
 each serving an average of 14,562 residents over the age of 21. In contrast, stores
 in private states serve an average of 7,944 residents, while stores in other control
 states serve 11,184. Even with both of our adjustments, Pennsylvania—and a good
 number of the other control states—thus has fewer stores per capita than do private
 states. The relative paucity of Pennsylvania stores may depress drinking: in 2005
 wine and spirit consumption averaged 3.61 gallons per capita in Pennsylvania,
 significantly short of the 5.15 gallons consumed in the average private state. In
 contrast, other control states that are active in alcohol retailing typically focus on
 spirits products only; their per capita consumption of spirits averaged 1.94 gallons
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 Figure 1. Scaled-up Number of Liquor Stores versus State Population
 in 2005, while Pennsylvania's was 1.53 gallons and private states averaged
 2.19 gallons.2
 How much more entry would we expect to see absent the PLCB? Based on the
 fitted relationship between log adjusted entry and log population for the private
 states, the PLCB operates 59 percent fewer stores than one might otherwise expect
 in Pennsylvania (2,355 stores). Hence, we can roughly estimate that a private sys
 tem for selling only wine and spirits in Pennsylvania would have (0.65) x (2,355),
 or 1,531 stores, roughly 2.5 times the current number.
 B. Pricing and Selection
 The PLCB charges an identical retail price for a particular product in all of its
 stores using a simple markup rule to determine the price. The pricing rule is set
 in the Pennsylvania Liquor Code by the state legislature. Accordingly, the PLCB
 applies a 30 percent markup and an 18 percent liquor tax to the wholesale price.3 In
 effect, Pennsylvania's liquor tax is 2.3 times higher than the average for other states:
 for the average bottle in our data, Pennsylvania's liquor tax is $ 1.89 per bottle, com
 pared with $0.81 in other states.4
 As we document in related work (Miravete et al. 2012), we have no conclusive
 evidence that retail prices vary systematically between Pennsylvania, other control,
 2 Calculated as the state's total apparent consumption by type of beverage divided by its population over the age
 of 21 (LaVallee and Yi 2011).
 3The specific pricing rule is retail price = (wholesale price (1.3) + bottle fee)(1.18), where the bottle fee
 amounts typically to $1 and the PLCB rounds the resulting retail price to end in the nearest nine cents. In addition,
 the consumer pays a 6 percent Pennsylvania sales tax.
 4 See American Wine Institute (2011 ), Distilled Spirits Council (2011 ), and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2011 ).
 We convert wine and spirits-based gallonage taxes from other states into a single, value-based, Pennsylvania tax rate
 by calculating a weighted average gallonage rate using the breakdown of sales into wines and spirits and expressing the
 resulting tax as a percentage of the mean marked-up Pennsylvania wholesale price.
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 and private states: Pennsylvania's prices are in line with, and frequently below, those
 in other control states. Small-sample comparisons of prices for specific products in
 Pennsylvania and retail stores in neighboring private states similarly do not suggest
 significant differences.
 Another possible difference between Pennsylvania's liquor retailing system and
 what might prevail in a private system is the product selection carried by each liquor
 store. According to the store-level data that we use in this paper (described in detail
 in Section III), the mean (median) PLCB store sold a total of 1,371 (1,254) different
 wine and spirits products, with a standard deviation of 709. While we lack simi
 larly detailed product availability data for stores in other states, we can compare the
 square footage of dedicated liquor stores in a random sample of zip codes in states
 bordering Pennsylvania (New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia)5 to the
 size of the PLCB stores. For the PLCB, the correlation between a store's average
 product selection and its square footage is 0.56, suggesting that store size proxies
 reasonably well for variety. Sample stores in the adjacent states are significantly
 smaller than Pennsylvania stores, with a median store size of 55 to 64 percent of the
 median PLCB store's size. Pennsylvania thus operates fewer, but larger, stores than
 alternative systems. These statistics suggest that the typical PLCB store does not
 carry fewer products than do stores in other states.
 C. Labor Costs
 The PLCB employs unionized store clerks and pays them according to a single,
 statewide pay scale. The 2007 Economic Census reports that the average pay per
 Pennsylvania employee in beer, wine, and liquor retailing was $26,000, or $43,680
 including benefits.6 The PLCB employed 4,896 workers in 2009, and total operating
 expenses ("Store, Warehouse, and Transportation Costs") were $299.7 million that
 year.7 Hence, labor costs were 5/7th of total operating expenses.8
 How do these labor costs compare with those in private states? According to
 the 2007 Economic Census, pay at stores selling beer, wine, and liquor (NAICS
 4453) averaged $16,000 per worker, or $21,000 with benefits, in private states, less
 than half the rate at the PLCB.9'10 In addition to paying more per worker, PLCB
 stores employ more workers per store. PLCB stores have an average of 7.9 workers
 per store, while, according to the 2007 Economic Census, liquor stores outside
 Pennsylvania had an average of 4.6 employees per store.
 5The data were obtained from Dun and Bradstreet and contain information on 64 stores in New Jersey; 136 stores
 in New York; 49 stores in Ohio; and 84 stores in West Virginia.
 6The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that state and local government service employees received $0.68 in
 benefits per dollar of pay. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t04.htm. We derive total labor costs inclusive
 of benefits by scaling wage payments by 1.68.
 7 See the PLCB Fiscal Year 09-10 Summary.
 8Luciew reports in a 2009 article, "Big Ideas: Sell the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board," in the Patriot News
 that the PLCB paid $224 million in total labor costs in 2007, when the agency had 4,439 employees, implying total
 labor cost of $50,000 per employee. For the sake of conservatism, we adopt the estimate in the text.
 9That is, excluding Pennsylvania as well as other states with at least some direct government involvement
 in retailing: Alabama, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia, as well as
 Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington.
 10The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that employees in retail trade earned $0.33 in benefits per dollar of pay.
 See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.tlO.htm.
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 The PLCB currently spends $1,110 per day to operate a store. How much would it
 cost to run a store absent the current system? We do not have information on rental
 expenses and distribution costs (each of which account for 1 /7th of PLCB operat
 ing expenses) in private states. Holding these fixed at current levels, we obtain one
 answer from assuming that Pennsylvania stores would have their current levels of
 employment but half the current rate of pay. We refer to this as the "competitive
 wage" alternative, and it results in $713 per store per day. We obtain a second esti
 mate by assuming the Pennsylvania stores would otherwise have both typical rates
 of pay and the more common levels of employment per store. We term this the
 "competitive cost" scenario, and it results in $549 per store per day. Thus, current
 store operation costs appear to be twice those in states with private systems.
 Before moving on, two descriptive facts uncovered above bear emphasis: relative
 to private states, (i) the PLCB faces high store operation costs, and (ii) the PLCB
 operates far fewer stores per capita than would likely prevail in a private system.
 Our goal in the remainder of the paper is to use these facts, along with a model of
 demand and a method for describing entry, to evaluate the welfare consequences
 of PLCB operation, along with its implicit motives.
 II. Data
 The basic dataset for the study is a store-level panel obtained from the PLCB under
 the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law.11 It contains daily information on quantities
 sold and gross receipts at the product and store levels during 2005. In addition, we
 received information on the wholesale cost of each product that is constant across
 stores and varies over time according to reporting periods described below. We geo
 code the stores' street addresses to assign them to a geographic location, which we
 link to data on population and demographic characteristics for nearby consumers
 based on information from the 2000 census and Reference USA. Because stores
 open and close during the year, the characteristics of stores' ambient consumers
 change over time.
 We aggregate our data across products to the level of either the day or the week.
 This periodicity accounts for the strong seasonality inherent in liquor sales, which
 are disguised in more aggregate definitions. Averaging across 32,509 store weeks in
 2005, stores sell an average of 2,674 bottles per week. Figure 2 exhibits the strong
 seasonal pattern to sales, with a trough after New Year's (week 1) and peaks at July
 Fourth (week 26), Thanksgiving (week 47), and Christmas through New Year's Eve
 (weeks 50-52).
 Because we treat liquor as a single quantity in our analysis below, we also need a
 single price. PLCB stores carry thousands of products, and we calculate a statewide
 price index that is a weighted average of the system-wide product prices in each
 week. We use fixed weights—the products' shares of 2005 sales—to avoid contami
 nating the price index with quantity responses.
 As discussed in Section II, the PLCB uses a markup formula to calculate prices.
 The PLCB is further able to pass on temporary wholesale price reductions to the
 '165 P.S. §§ 66.1 et seq., as amended.
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 Figure 2. Weekly Average Number of Bottles Sold per Store
 consumer in the form of system-wide monthly sale periods (28-day period beginning
 on the Monday closest to the end of the month). As a result, we observe changes in
 prices for two reasons: (i) an adjustment in wholesale prices, or (ii) temporary sale
 prices on a subset of products. The PLCB negotiates wholesale prices directly with
 its suppliers. A new product's wholesale price remains fixed for one year after intro
 duction. For established products, the PLCB renegotiates over cost increases on a
 quarterly basis rotating through product categories over the course of its four-week
 long reporting periods. Each reporting period, the wholesale price of a subset of
 products is adjusted, translating into changes in the retail price. In contrast to sales
 periods, which typically begin on the last Monday of a month, reporting periods
 begin on a Thursday, usually in the middle of the month. Prices can therefore change
 at two discrete times per month, and our price series resembles a step function.12
 While stores differ in the mix of products sold, these differences reflect het
 erogeneity in consumer preferences more than differences in availability. Of the
 100 best-selling products statewide in 2005, the median store carried 98.0 percent
 in its median week, while a store at the fifth percentile carried 72.0 percent of the
 products. Similarly, of the 1,000 best-selling products statewide in 2005, the median
 store carried 82.0 percent in its median week, while a store at the fifth percentile car
 ried 44.2 percent of the products. The PLCB operates 65 larger stores that are desig
 nated "premium-collection" stores.13 The product availability at premium stores is
 somewhat better than the average, with the median premium store carrying all of the
 top 100 products and 95.1 percent of the top 1,000 products. But most stores carry
 12 In our data, 90.26 percent of price changes occur within one week from the beginning of a new reporting or
 sales period, reflecting that not all products have daily sales in at least one PLCB store.
 13 The PLCB also operates seven "outlet" stores near the borders with neighboring states. In addition to the typi
 cal selection, the PLCB sells certain products—typically larger-sized bottles or multi-packs—at these stores that
 are unavailable in the remaining stores.
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 most products, supporting our assumption below that differences in product avail
 ability do not drive customers' store choices to a significant degree. In our empirical
 exercises below we employ a single statewide price index reflecting our model's
 implicit assumption of a single identical product available at each store.14
 A. Descriptive Evidence
 Our model of demand links purchase behavior to demographic characteristics,
 the configuration of stores, and price. In this section we explore these relationships
 as a step toward more formal estimation. We first examine the relationship between
 prices and demand, via regressions of log quantities on measures of log prices.
 It is possible that prices move endogenously with anticipated changes in demand.
 We address this potential endogeneity of the price series in a number of ways. First,
 we control for unusual spikes or declines in demand around holidays by including
 time dummies for holiday weeks or days, or a more flexible quadratic seasonality
 specification; since prices vary only across time and not place, we cannot include
 fully flexible time dummies. These time terms address endogeneity concerns to the
 extent that they control for the relevant temporary changes in demand that manufac
 turers anticipate when choosing their wholesale price discounts. The price elasticity
 is identified from the covariation in quantity and the price index after accounting for
 common contemporaneous changes in sales experienced at the same time. Second,
 we employ a price index that removes price declines due to the potentially endog
 enous discounts. We call this the list price and build a statewide, fixed-weight price
 index based on it.
 Across specifications that differ in seasonality controls, periodicity of the data,
 inclusion of store fixed effect, and the selection of the sample, we find that demand
 is relatively inelastic with a price elasticity ranging from —0.7 to —1.9 (see Table 1).
 This is in line with estimates from the large empirical literature estimating the elas
 ticity of demand for liquor. Cook and Moore (1999) reviews the literature on demand
 for alcohol, most of which use state-level time series data. According to Chaloupka,
 Grossman, and Safer (2002, p. 23), "An extensive review of the economic literature
 on alcohol demand concluded that based on studies using aggregate data (i.e., data
 that report the amount of alcohol consumed by large groups of people), the price
 elasticities of demand for beer, wine, and distilled spirits are —0.3, —1.0, and —1.5,
 respectively (Leung and Phelps 1993)."
 The second relationship of interest is between ambient population and quantity
 demanded. Table 2 explores this relationship systematically with multiple regres
 sion using the population-weighted average great-circle distance15 to the store as
 a proxy for travel cost. In aggregate, assuming that all population resides at cen
 sus tract centroids, the average (median) great-circle distance to the nearest store
 is 3.2 (2.4) kilometers, with an interquartile range of 1.0 to 3.6 km. The descrip
 tive results suggest that population increases demand while demand declines with
 14We performed various descriptive exercises (like those in Table 1) with store-specific price indices, and their
 use results in demand elasticities similar to those implied by the statewide index.
 15 Great-circle distances are calculated according to the Haversine formula and measure the shortest distance
 along the surface of a sphere between any two locations.
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 Table 1—Price Elasticity Evidence
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
 Panel A. Weekly data (32,509 observations)
 log state bundle list price  -0.963  — 1.090***  -1.318  -1.340***
 1.230  0.176  1.356  0.181
 log state bundle price  -1.893**  —1.940***
 0.738  0.105
 Constant  9.888***  10.208***  10.690***  10.747***  12.227***  12.348***
 3.095  0.444  3.410  0.454  1.857  0.265
 R2  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07
 Quadratic time trend  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No
 Store fixed effect  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes
 (1)  (2)  (3)a  (4)a
 Panel B. Daily data (191,921 observations unless noted)
 log state bundle price  -0.733  -0.711***  -1.487  -1.054***
 0.387  0.110  0.947  0.257
 Constant  7 759***  6.903***  9.768***  7.882***
 0.973  0.276  2.379  0.645
 R2  0.19  0.16  0.07  0.38
 Quadratic time trend  Yes  Yes  No  No
 Holidays  Yes  Yes  No  No
 Store fixed effect  No  Yes  No  Yes
 Notes: Dependent variable is log bottles per time period per store. Regressions of log bottles sold on various mea
 sures of the price. Holiday week dummies for the weeks 1, 26. 47, 50, 51, and 52 included. We include separate
 time trends for the period January-October and the holiday period of November-December. Regressions using
 daily data include day of the week fixed effects. State-bundle prices use a constant bundle for computing the price
 and vary only by time and not across stores.
 "Sample consists of 23,587 days immediately prior to and following a price change.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 Table 2—Demand, Population, and Distance to the Nearest Store
 Average  Average log  log daily  log daily  log daily  log daily
 daily sales  daily sales  sales per  sales per  sales per  sales per
 per store  per store  store  store  store  store
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
 Catchment area pop./10.000  173.761***  0.449***  0.187***  0.036***  0.187***  0.036***
 12.471  0.030  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
 Average distance to nearest store  -23.861***  -0.081***  -0.077***  -0.016***  -0.077***  -0.016***
 2.853  0.007  4.3E-04  0.001  4.3E-04  0.001
 log state bundle list price  -0.846**  -0.657***
 0.414  0.128
 log state bundle price  -0.623*  -0.696***
 0.352  0.109
 Constant  273.706***  5.365***  7.586***  g 712***  7.025***  6.809***
 25.175  0.061  1.042  0.323  0.393  0.274
 Observations  635  635  191,921  191,921  191,921  191,921
 R2  0.27  0.33  0.33  0.21  0.33  0.21
 Store fixed effect  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 ♦Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 distance to the nearest store; the estimated price elasticity is robust to the inclusion
 of demographics at —0.9.
 Table 2, as well as our estimates below, employs daily price and quantity data.
 With this level of aggregation, there is variation in catchment areas over time since
 different stores are open on different days and at different times of the year. We
 observe several permanent changes to the store configuration during the year:
 12 new stores opened in 2005, while 6 existing stores closed. Three other stores
 relocated. There is also regular variation in catchment areas over the course of the
 week. While most stores are open six days per week, 10 percent of PLCB stores are
 open on Sundays as of the beginning of 2005. Following authorization by the state
 legislature to increase this set of stores, we observe an additional 90 stores recording
 Sunday sales by the end of 2005. The PLCB phased in the conversion of these stores
 to seven days a week gradually over the course of the year. Twelve stores have lim
 ited hours and are consistently closed on one or two of the six regular business days.
 There are also temporary closings, which we identify in the data as regular sales
 days where no sales were recorded for a given store. Two stores were closed for an
 extended period of several weeks, while 61 stores recorded no sales for a subset of
 their regular sales days for at least one, and frequently for several, weekdays. These
 openings and closings help identify the effect of distance to the store on demand
 beyond purely cross-sectional variation.16
 We also explore descriptively how sensitive the results in Table 2 are to some of
 the salient features of the Pennsylvania liquor market. First, we reestimate specifica
 tions (3) and (4) excluding holiday weeks (Thanksgiving week and last three weeks
 of December) from the sample, to test whether the base results are driven by differ
 ences in willingness to pay for liquor or travel to the store in these unusual weeks.
 We obtain very similar results with this limited sample. Second, we explore whether
 systematic differences in demand in areas close to Pennsylvania's borders, including
 in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, drive the relationships in Table 2. Demand in these
 areas may be more elastic than in the interior of the state due to the easier access
 to alternative shopping sources. The descriptive regressions do not yield conclusive
 evidence to that effect.
 Table 1 and Table 2 provide clear evidence for the mechanisms that underlie our
 story: having more potential customers nearby raises demand, as does their proxim
 ity to their nearest store. Higher prices reduce demand, via the demand curve. We
 now turn to a simple model to estimate these effects, allowing us to predict sales
 under alternative store configurations.
 16Note that despite the panel nature of our data, store fixed effects do not address a possible concern about unob
 served spatial heterogeneity. We would ideally like to control for unobserved preference shifters of consumers that
 may be correlated with the distance such consumers travel to the store. We do not, however, observe the demand
 associated with particular consumers. Instead, we observe store-level demand. Because the group of consumers
 nearest each store varies across days, a store fixed effect does not control for the same consumers' unobserved
 demand. While we report a fixed-effect estimate of the distance coefficient in Table 2 nevertheless, we address a
 concern over spatial heterogeneity in demand by investigating the robustness of the estimates of our full demand
 model to the inclusion of a host of potential observable demand shifters below.
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 III. A Simple Model of Demand with Travel Cost
 We seek a model that, for any set of store locations, can indicate both the demand
 and producer and consumer surplus from consumption by individuals in each piece of
 geography. The key behavioral relationships that the model must describe are (i) the
 sensitivity of demand to consumers' distance to stores, and (ii) the price elasticity
 of demand, which allows us to attach a dollar value to proximity. We could directly
 relate quantities sold at a store to, say, population in its area and other demand shift
 ers, such as median income in the area. Table 2 reports such regressions, but they
 cannot be used to predict sales under a counterfactual set of stores or locations, and,
 in turn, to calculate the change in consumer surplus from an additional store or a
 change in store configuration. This goal, instead, requires a model of demand at the
 level of geography where consumers reside. We use a discrete-choice framework to
 model the consumer's decision to purchase liquor and estimate its parameters based
 on the PLCB's current stores to address these requirements.
 A. Demand and Distance
 There are S stores located around the state. We assume that a consumer i patron
 izes the store s nearest his residence. This assumption, which would arise endog
 enously if stores were identical in selection, given that pricing is identical across
 stores, divides the state into S catchment areas containing all of the population near
 est to each store. We make this assumption, as well as several others, to facilitate the
 determination of optimal store configurations, discussed below.
 We denote each store's catchment area by Cst. Formally, Cst is the set of con
 sumer locations r such that store location s is the closest to location r on day t, or
 Cst-{drst = minsidrs, Vs'E Sopent, Vr = 1,...,/?}, where drs denotes the distance,
 measured in an appropriate metric, of consumer i in location r from the store's loca
 tion s, for all stores open on day t and contained in set Sopen t. We discretize consumer
 locations in the state by modeling demand at the level of the census tract and place
 all residents at each tract's centroid. We then assign census tracts to store catchment
 areas by finding the store s whose street address is closest in distance to each tract
 centroid. The use of census tracts—relative to finer divisions of the state such as
 census block groups—introduces some measurement error into the distances con
 sumers travel. It yields, however, a more manageable set of 3,125 consumer loca
 tions, which we also use as potential store locations in the simulations that follow.
 Our lack of data on individual purchases prevents us from distinguishing between
 the decision to visit a store and the decision of how many bottles to purchase.17
 Instead, we assume that consumers purchase a single bottle of liquor during a shop
 ping occasion and model consumer /'s conditional indirect utility from traveling to
 store 5 on day t to purchase a bottle of liquor as
 (1)  ^ijrst fid drs PpPt "I" &ijrsf
 17 A further downside to observing store-level, rather than consumer-level, data is that we cannot explore the
 extent to which people who live farther from a store choose to make fewer, but larger, shopping trips and store
 the product more.
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 We aggregate consumers to demographic groups j. In equation (1), Xjrt is a vec
 tor of attributes for consumers of type j in location r and seasonal effects. The term
 £ijrst denotes an unobserved utility shifter that we assume to be distributed extreme
 value. Prior studies of alcohol demand suggest that demand varies with age, income,
 and the racial composition of households (see, e.g., Heien and Pompelli 1989 and
 Wang et al. 1996). Consequently, we differentiate between black (B) and other-race
 residents (O) and include among the Xjrt the group's per capita income and median
 age using data from the 2000 census.
 A consumer chooses to purchase from his store provided that his utility exceeds
 the utility of the outside option of not purchasing. We normalize its value to zero.
 Our assumption of extreme-value distributed £ijrst yields logit purchase probabilities,
 7r, for consumers of each demographic group j in a particular location r :
 eXp(Xj„PA; - Pdd„ - PpP,)
 [ ' *jrs' ~ 1 + exp(X;rA - Mrs - PpP.) '
 To derive a store's predicted demand, we aggregate over the decisions of poten
 tial consumers across demographic groups j within a tract location and across all
 of the locations that make up a store catchment area, Cst. We consider as poten
 tial consumers the population of each census tract over the age of 21. Aggregate
 demand for liquor in tract r, Qrst, and at store s, Qst, is thus the weighted average
 probability of purchase across demographic types and, for the store, across tracts,
 using as weights each tract's mass of consumers of a particular type, scaled up by
 the total potential consumers:
 (3) Qrst drs, p¡ \ 0)Mjrt
 j={B.O}
 Qst = Y, %r Mst = KstMsn
 reCs,Mst
 where Mjrt denotes the number of potential consumers of type j in tract location r
 and Mst — YLr(=c ,^j={B o\^¡r< t'ie potential consumers in the store's aggregate catch
 ment area.
 Estimation proceeds via maximum likelihood. The parameter estimates maximize
 the likelihood of observing actual sales in store s on day t, Q:l, given data on the
 price of liquor and on the demographics and distance from the store of the locations
 making up the store catchment area. The log-likelihood function is given by
 t s
 (4) \n£ = openst)(Qsi 1 n(7rï() + (Mst - Qsl) ln(l - ttJ),
 t= i í=i
 where I(openst) is an indicator of whether store s is open on day t. We identify the
 parameters from observing variation in the price of liquor over time ((3p) and cross
 sectional and time-series variation in the composition of catchment areas, resulting
 in variation in distances traveled (¡3d) and demographic attributes ( [3J.
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 B. Demand, Model Estimates
 To keep the estimation manageable, we rely on a randomly drawn 10 percent
 subset of the daily data.18 Beyond age, race, and income, we proxy for variation in
 local attitudes toward liquor consumption by including in utility each tract's number
 of churches per capita, derived from a statewide listing of religious organizations
 from Reference USA.
 We capture travel costs by considering three different distance-based measures.
 First, we use distance traveled from the centroid of each tract to the store along
 the existing road network. We compute the distances based on the shortest route
 between two locations, using the program MPMileage. We do so for the distances
 between all Pennsylvania tracts and the existing stores, as well as—for the purposes
 of computing demand under counterfactual store configurations below—between
 all tracts themselves.19 Second, we employ the great-circle distance in kilometers
 between locations. MPMileage further generates the average travel time in minutes
 between any two locations, which we use as our last travel cost proxy.
 We allow for systematic variation in the travel cost depending on features of the
 consumer's place of residence by interacting the distance to the store with the per
 cent of tract households that lack a car. This specification reflects that the mode of
 transportation to the store may differ between residents of cities and those in less
 urban areas.
 As in our descriptive regressions, we address the fact that the PLCB may time
 sales and thus price reductions to coincide with unobserved temporal variation in
 liquor demand by employing the list-price prior to sales as our price index for the
 composite liquor product. We also control for seasonal effects by including day
 of the week effects, week dummies for holiday weeks (the week after New Year's
 (week 1), July Fourth (week 26), Thanksgiving (week 47), and Christmas through
 New Year's Eve (weeks 50-52)), and additional holiday dummies for Memorial
 Day (May 28, 2005), days close to July 4 (June 30, July 1-July 3, 2005), Labor
 Day (September 3, 2005), and days around Thanksgiving (November 23-26, 2005).
 The price elasticity is thus identified from a response in sales to price changes in
 otherwise similar days.
 Driving distance is, not surprisingly, systematically larger than, but closely related
 to, great-circle distance. A regression of driving distance to the closest store on
 great-circle distance to the closest store for each of Pennsylvania's 3,125 tracts indi
 cates that each additional kilometer of great-circle distance adds 1.4 km of driving
 distance, with an R2 of 0.94. The regression also indicates that, on top of the aspect
 of driving distance that is proportional to great-circle distance, driving distance
 contains an additional 0.2 km, or systematic deviations from proportionality. These
 18For the descriptive regressions in Table 2, the estimated parameters using the subsample do not differ signifi
 cantly from the results obtained using the full sample of data.
 19Due to the computational burden of computing driving distances for 3,125 x 3,124 tract combinations, we
 calculate exact driving distances only for the 25 tracts nearest each consumer tract location based on straight-line dis
 tance. We use an approximation based on an estimated linear relationship between driving and straight-line distance
 for more distant tracts. In our simulations of alternative store networks below, consumers in all tract locations are
 typically assigned to a store in one of their neighboring ten tracts for store configurations of plausible size.
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 deviations from proportionality leave room for possible differences in the estimated
 demand models using the alternative distance measures.
 The coefficients of the estimated demand function appear in Table 3. Column 1
 reports results based on driving distance in kilometers as our distance metric. We
 rely on these results in the remainder of the paper. Columns 2 and 3 report the
 results based on great-circle distance and driving time in minutes, respectively. Most
 of the parameters are stable across specifications. The estimated price coefficients
 translate into an average price elasticity of — 1.2 to —1.5, similar to the estimates in
 Table 1 and Table 2.
 In specification (1), the estimated parameters on distance and distance interacted
 with the percent of the population without access to a car imply that demand declines
 by 61 (98) cents for every kilometer (mile) driven to the store for a tract with the
 median share of households without car access of 8.18 percent. Based on straight
 line distance in column 2, we estimate a travel cost of 84 cents per kilometer of
 straight-line distance to the store. The increase in the estimated effect relative to the
 driving distance model reflects that driving distance is typically larger than great
 circle distance. The estimated travel cost is similar to the implied travel cost under
 driving distance when scaled down by the factor of proportionality of 1.4 above,
 resulting in an equivalent travel cost of 60 cents per kilometer of driving distance.
 In the driving-time model in specification (3), we estimate an implied travel cost of
 50 cents per minute added to each leg of a round trip to the store. Based on custom
 ers traveling between 35 and 50 km per hour, this translates into a cost per kilometer
 of driving distance of 50 to 86 cents. Our alternative distance specifications thus
 result in relatively similar travel costs.
 The results suggest further that travel costs increase in the percentage of households
 without a car; based on the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, travel costs per kilometer
 range from 39 cents (when virtually all households have access to a car) to 157 cents
 (when 35 percent of households do not have access to a car). The decline of travel cost
 with greater car access reflects the time difference between driving and its alternatives
 and lends credence to a travel-cost interpretation of our distance coefficient.
 Our travel cost estimates are consistent with the existing work, although the litera
 ture contains a relatively wide range of travel cost estimates. Davis (2006) estimates
 that a consumer who travels 3.2 km in total incurs a travel cost of approximately 20
 cents per kilometer of great-circle distance, while Thomadsen (2005) finds travel
 costs of $1.86 per kilometer of driving distance. McManus (2007) finds that con
 sumers are willing to pay $4 to avoid walking an additional mile from their location
 to the retail outlet reflecting the increase in time spent to cover one mile walking
 relative to driving. Houde (2012) estimates that an average consumer is willing to
 add 1 minute in travel time to save 67 cents on a purchase of 20 liters of gasoline.
 Across specifications, areas with higher median income have higher demand;
 demand does not vary significantly with age. While the point estimates suggest that
 demand is lower in areas with a larger number of churches per capita and a lower
 percent of black households, the effects are statistically significant at conventional
 levels for specification (2) only.
 While we rely primarily on specification (1) in the simulations that follow, we
 investigate several alternative specifications of our travel demand model. Across
 specifications, the price and distance coefficients are similar to the ones in Table 3.
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 Table 3—Demand Model Estimates
 (1)  (2)  (3)
 State-bundle list price  -0.164***  -0.153**  -0.124
 0.049  0.077  0.098
 Driving distance  -0.050***
 0.016
 (Driving distance) x (percent without car)  -0.006**
 0.003
 Straight-line distance  -0.061***
 0.019
 (Straight-line distance) x (percent without car)  -0.008***
 0.003
 Driving time  -0.062***
 0.013
 (Driving time) x (percent without car)  -0.001
 0.001
 Black  0.214  0.209  0.165
 0.188  0.172  0.137
 Median income  0.034***  0.033***  0.033***
 0.005  0.004  0.005
 Median age  — 2.E-04  l.E-04  0.0128
 2.E-04  2.E-04  0.0127
 Number of churches per capita  -0.105  -0.154**  -0.226
 0.089  0.060  0.428
 Monday  0.501***  0.517***  0.593***
 0.057  0.058  0.067
 Tuesday  0.546***  0.563***  0.627***
 0.061  0.061  0.073
 Wednesday  0.663***  0.681***  0.748***
 0.059  0.060  0.073
 Thursday  0.819***  0.834***  0.919***
 0.058  0.060  0.069
 Friday  1.368***  1.384***  1.455***
 0.060  0.058  0.067
 Saturday  ! 393***  \ 414***  1.487***
 0.056  0.056  0.065
 Implied elasticity of demand  -1.267  -1.184  -1.478
 Implied travel cost ($) per unit  0.606  0.841  0.498
 Notes: Results based on daily store-level data for a 10 percent subset ( 19,255 observations) of all store-day observa
 tions. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications). We include separate holiday effects for May 28, June 30-July
 3, September 3, and November 23-26. Specification (1) uses the shortest distance in kilometer along the road net
 work; specification (2) uses the straight-line distance in kilometer; and specification (3) uses the travel time in min
 utes associated with the shortest travel distance.
 ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 First, we estimated a variant of specification (1) based on both daytime and eve
 ning/weekend population, allowing consumers a choice of consuming either from
 their place of residence or from their place of work. The estimates are similar to the
 main results with a more elastic demand elasticity of — 1.6.
 Second, we test the role of various alternative determinants of demand to ensure
 that their effect does not get absorbed by our main demand drivers, most notably dis
 tance. We allow demand to vary between rural and urban tracts and with the popula
 tion density of the county. We investigate whether the presence of fundamentalist
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 churches (as classified in Smith 1986) whose congregants might place a higher
 value on limited alcohol consumption than church congregants in general, is a
 stronger proxy for demand than aggregate church density. In both cases, the addi
 tional regressors were not statistically significant in affecting demand and travel
 cost remained stable, ranging from 53 to 64 cents per kilometer of driving distance.
 Third, we consider various, more flexible specifications for travel costs and the
 price coefficient. We approximate the cost of travel with a quadratic distance speci
 fication. The price elasticity under this alternative specification is —1.34 and the
 travel cost implied by the quadratic specification increases slightly in distance. At
 the mean distance of consumer to store locations, it amounts to 66 cents per kilome
 ter of driving distance, similar to the estimates above, and ranges from 60 cents to
 67 cents for the 25th and 75th percentile of distances traveled, respectively.
 We consider whether consumers are less sensitive to distance traveled when they
 are able to combine the trip to the liquor store with other shopping occasions. Results
 including interactions of distance with the number of grocery stores or the number
 of discounters in the liquor store's tract do not suggest, however, that consumers
 are willing to travel a larger distance to liquor stores in close proximity to other
 similar retailers. For the median tract, travel costs remain at 61 cents per kilometer
 of driving distance. Further, we do not find significant evidence that the distance
 coefficient varies significantly with tract income. Lastly, we allow the price coef
 ficient to vary with tract income. Our results suggest that demand is less responsive
 in higher-income areas with an interquartile range for the price elasticity of — 1.65 to
 — 1.36 for consumers in tracts with the 25th and 75th percentiles of income. Online
 Appendix A provides details on the specifications, data sources, and, in Table A-l,
 the results of these alternative demand specifications.
 To evaluate openings or closures of stores and changes in store locations, we need
 to compute the welfare benefit of alternative store configurations. Our model shows
 how much the demand by persons in each location (and, by extension, the quantity
 sold at each store) changes with the distance to the closest store. Opening a store
 near location r has two effects on consumer welfare: First, current purchasers in and
 close to location r face a lower effective price (inclusive of travel). Second, a larger
 share of consumers in location r purchase under the lower effective price. This gen
 erates additional consumer surplus.
 For the chosen specification, daily consumer surplus (CS) for consumers in loca
 tion r is given by
 if store s serves tract location r (see Small and Rosen 1981). The consumers in loca
 tion r generate daily producer surplus (PS) to the store, based on the markup of the
 retail price p, over the wholesale price c,\
 C. Welfare Measures
 (5)  CSrs, = -4-1 Y. ln(! +exirSx 0jdrs 0Pp')Mjrt I
 Pp \mb.o} I
 (6)  (pt Ct)Qrst
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 The daily total surplus (TS) generated by store s is therefore
 (7) TSsl = E (CSrsr + PSrs!) - K,
 reCst
 where K denotes the daily fixed cost of operating a store.
 D. Comparing Alternative Entry Patterns
 To assess the goals underlying the PLCB's store configuration, we derive several
 benchmark configurations, including the store layout chosen by a profit-maximiz
 ing monopolist and a benevolent monopolist. These rely on the R x R matrix Y of
 consumer-location-to-store-location matches. We define Yrs to be one if consumers
 in location r are served by a store in location s, and zero otherwise. The Y matrix
 also indicates S, the total number of stores operating, as trace(Y) = Es=, Yss- We
 continue to assume in our simulations that locations are census tracts. Since we do
 not observe a store in every tract in the data and do not model where within a tract
 the store would locate, we use each tract's centroid as a potential store's location.
 For a given store configuration, the average daily profits of the system are then
 (8) n = EyEE^,r„ - 1=1 i 5=1 r=l 5=1
 The profit in equation (8) includes two parts. The first, E,?=1 1 /^E^iE* i s>
 is the producer surplus that results from a particular configuration of stores and the
 rule that demand is assigned to its closest locations. The second part of the maxi
 mand is simply the fixed cost of operating the chosen number of stores. The profit
 maximizing monopolist's problem is to find the store configuration that maximizes
 profit, while a benevolent monopolist's problem is to find the configuration that
 maximizes welfare (replacing PSrsl with PSrs, + CSrst).
 Solving this optimization problem is difficult because of the sheer number of
 possible store configurations. There are 2R possible configurations of stores to
 evaluate. Even with a small set of possible locations, e.g., 25, there are over 33
 million configurations. Operations researchers have developed efficient integer
 programming algorithms, such as "branch and bound," for solving problems of this
 sort.20 We are able to rely on these sophisticated algorithms to solve problems of
 moderately large size.21 Here we state the problem as an integer program; online
 Appendix B provides an overview of the branch-and-bound algorithm we employ
 in finding optimal store configurations.
 20We employ LINGO 13.0 to solve these problems.
 21 Our problem is closely related to the facilities location problem analyzed in Perl and Ho (1990). Chan,
 Padmanabhan, and Seetharaman (2007) employs the same integer programming techniques we use in their study
 of the optimal location choices of retail gas stations in Singapore where the regulator determines outlet locations,
 but then licenses the outlet operations to private firms. They illustrate how to estimate a reduced-form demand
 distribution across consumer locations from realized outlet locations under the maintained assumption that the
 government's objective is the minimization of the sum of consumer distances from their closest gas station and that
 actual location choices are optimal given this objective.
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 Expressed as an integer programming problem, the profit-maximizing planner's
 maximand is
 (9) maxll = ~ KÍtYss
 Y t= 1 s= \ r=\ j=l
 E4 = 1 Vr,
 Í=1
 Yss>Yrs Vr,s,r=£s,
 Yrs = {0,1} Vr,s.
 Constraint (10) indicates that each demand location must be assigned to a sin
 gle store location. Constraint (11) prevents the assignment of demand to locations
 without a store. Constraint (12) makes the assignment of demand to supply binary:
 each demand location is either served by a particular supply location, or not. The
 alternative problem where the monopolist maximizes welfare less fixed costs can be
 expressed analogously.
 Finding a solution via integer programming requires fixed coefficients on the
 binary store-location variables. Here, these fixed coefficients are the values of
 PSrst and CSrst. That is, we need to know the amount of demand or welfare that each
 demand location would contribute to each store in each possible configuration. We
 are able to calculate these coefficients in advance of the optimization because our
 demand model assigns each demand location to its nearest store. This would not be
 the case if we allowed consumers to choose not only whether to purchase liquor, but
 also from which store to purchase in a multinomial choice model of demand. Then a
 store's demand from any location would depend not simply on the distance between
 the store and demand locations but rather on the entire configuration of stores. That
 is, each PSrst and CSrst would depend on the entire 2R configuration.
 Integer programming approaches are strained by the problem of locating stores
 throughout the state's 3,125 tracts. We consider two alternatives. First, we find the
 optimal configurations on a county-by-county basis for each of Pennsylvania's
 67 counties. We then aggregate across counties to derive profit, consumer welfare,
 and total welfare across the state. This procedure likely differs from the statewide
 optimal configuration in counties where a significant share of the population resides
 close to the county borders and might choose to consume out-of-county, which we
 preclude. As a second alternative, we find a statewide store configuration by turning
 to "greedy" algorithms, which provide intuitive and less computationally burden
 some approaches (Daskin 1995). We implement such an algorithm, which we term
 "sequential myopic entry" (SME), as follows. Beginning from a first location that
 maximizes its stand-alone profits (or welfare) among the state's full set of tracts, we
 keep adding stores that maximize incremental profit (or welfare), holding the previ
 ous stores' locations fixed, until the marginal profit or welfare of the incremental
 location falls below the fixed cost of an additional store.
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 The SME configuration is not, in general, the same as the configuration that
 simultaneously maximizes the profit available from n stores. Sequential myopic
 entry overstates the benefit of each inframarginal entrant because its marginal ben
 efit is—myopically—predicated on the (n — 1 ) stores already operating, rather
 than the total number that will ultimately operate. When the last store has been
 added, the marginal benefits of the inframarginal stores are smaller than they were
 when the stores were marginal. To assess the magnitude of such biases, we com
 pare results under sequential myopic entry with the simultaneous-move optima for
 small areas where these can be calculated.
 E. Private Entry
 In addition to examining profit- and welfare-maximizing store configurations, we
 would also like to explore configurations that would arise under atomistic private
 entry, either unconstrained or regulated to a constrained number of entrants. The
 usual condition for equilibrium with free entry by symmetric firms is that the S firms
 operating are each profitable while (5+1) would not be.22 Here, because of the
 vagaries of geography, equilibrium is more complicated. Each firm (store) must be
 profitable; there must be no room for further entry; and no firm may wish to switch
 its location.
 A challenge in employing our estimates to assess a private alternative to the cur
 rent regime is that in our empirical context, prices and markups are fixed and set
 by the state legislature. This undermines our ability to predict the extent of spatial
 price competition in a free-entry alternative, and we continue to assume that firms
 charge the regulated price in the private entry context. Because the price-reducing
 mechanism usually present with free entry is absent, the model likely generates
 more stores than would actually operate if entry were truly unregulated. Hence,
 the number of firms under unregulated free entry from the model should be viewed
 either as an upper bound or as a simulation of a fixed-price regime, as might operate
 if the state regulated prices with an optimal Pigouvian tax.
 Due to the computational burden of identifying the equilibrium in a simultaneous
 move game of the size we consider, we employ a sequential myopic algorithm simi
 lar to those introduced above, although some adaptation is needed for free entry.
 First, we find the location that maximizes a lone store's revenue.23 If this location
 is profitable, it remains. The second store locates at the location that generates the
 most profit, given the location of the first store. That is, the second store locates at
 its best response, evaluated given the first store's location. If either store is unprof
 itable, it is withdrawn. Then another store locates at the most profitable available
 location, and so on. The process ends when there is no location for profitable entry,
 and each existing store is profitable.24 This deviates from Nash equilibrium because
 22This is the condition for equilibrium in homogeneous goods entry models such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
 and Berry (1992). Entry models dealing with product positioning include Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2006).
 23 We investigated the sensitivity of the resulting configuration to our choice of the initial store's location using
 one Pennsylvania county as a case study. Configurations that result from starting the SME algorithm in each of the
 county's tracts in turn result in an identical final configuration in all but one instance that differs in the location of
 a single store.
 24Our free entry simulations do not always converge to a single configuration. Instead, they generally cycle
 among a small number of possible configurations. For example, the free entry simulation with a fixed cost threshold
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 the stores, while profitable, might be more profitable if they switched locations.
 Only the last entrant is necessarily on its best response function. Still, the algorithm
 shows—approximately—how many stores free entry could support.
 This algorithm is clearly neither fully rational nor, as a result, fully optimal. When
 stores enter, they find the location that is currently most profitable, given existing
 entry. Entrepreneurs do not anticipate, however, how subsequent entry will affect the
 profitability of the locations they choose and continue operating until they are ren
 dered unprofitable by other, unforeseen, entry. Still, it seems reasonable to expect, if
 S simultaneously operating stores are profitable, that the free entry equilibrium has
 at least S stores. Even this simple algorithm is somewhat computationally challeng
 ing since in each iteration, we must check the profitability of each store (rather than
 just the entire system).
 IV. Effect of State Control on Liquor Retailing
 We have already seen, in Section II, that the PLCB operates fewer stores than
 would likely exist under a private system. Our goal here is to quantify the welfare
 and distributional consequences of the PLCB using our demand model along with
 our characterization of private entry. To this end, we compare a model simulation
 of the current PLCB configuration against one of two plausible alternatives: first,
 privatization of liquor retailing in Pennsylvania holding the liquor tax at current
 levels, and second, free entry under a reduced liquor tax that is typical for private
 states, using the national average tax rate.25 Given, as discussed in Section III, that
 we hold prices fixed in our free-entry simulations, the lower liquor tax is equivalent
 to a higher variable profit per bottle.
 We calculate each store's variable profit using the demand estimates from our
 main specification in column 1 in Table 3. We set the retail and wholesale prices
 to their mean values in 2005 with p = $12.38 and marginal cost c = $7.31. For the
 privatization simulations, we initially presume that the current tax structure would
 remain in the absence of the PLCB system. Of the $5.07 difference between aver
 age retail and wholesale prices for a bottle, $1.89 is liquor tax, while the remaining
 $3.18 is variable profit. Then we reduce taxes to private-system rates, where we
 assume a liquor tax of $0.81 per bottle, leaving $4.26 as variable profit.
 The actual PLCB system has 621 stores in 603 distinct locations. The model
 simulation of the actual system predicts that the sale of 256,502 bottles per typical
 day generates $10.50 million in consumer surplus. Each day the system generates
 $0.13 million in profit, along with $0.48 million in liquor tax and $0.35 million in
 labor surplus. The total of these three components, which we collectively term "total
 producer surplus/rents," is $0.96 million per day. See Table 4.
 The comparison of Pennsylvania liquor retailing with other states in Section II
 suggests that if it had a private system selling wine and spirits, Pennsylvania would
 have substantially more stores: private states have, on average, 1,531 stores to serve
 of $618 eventually cycles among 8 possible configuration sizes: 1,523, 1,524,..., and 1,530. Once the cycling
 begins, 95 percent of iterations produce configurations of between 1,525 and 1,529.
 25 These differ from current private systems in that we consider the issuance of a statewide pool of liquor
 licenses, while in practice governments commonly allocate licenses at the level of the municipality or county. For
 an overview of state policies, see Toma ( 1988).
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 Table 4—Statewide Comparisons: Actual and Free Entry Configurations
 Number of Bottles







 Actual (cost = $1,110) 621 256,502  10,498  960  11,458
 Private Pennsylvania (liquor tax = current liquor tax)
 Free entry (FC = $ 1,110) 527 254,885
 Free entry (FC = $713) 906 279,633










 Private Pennsylvania (liquor tax = average tax of private states)
 Free entry (FC = $618) 1,527 303,192  10,797  699  11,495
 Private Pennsylvania (no liquor tax)
 Free entry (FC = $549) 2,230 322,197  10,921  409  11,330
 Free entry targeting size of welfare-maximizing configuration
 Free entry 1,130 289,533  10,706  848  11,554
 Welfare-maximizing planner configurations of the size of privatized configurations
 NFE under FC = $1,110 527 274,507 10,615
 FE under FC = $713 906 303,454 10,799







 Notes: Consumer surplus, total producer rents, and total surplus reported in thousands. Producer rents calculated as
 the sum of variable profit under the given tax structure, labor surplus ((FC - $549) x number of stores), and tax
 revenue, less the total store operating costs. Welfare-maximizing planner configurations of the size of the free-entry
 configurations derived using the SME algorithm.
 markets with the size of Pennsylvania's wine and spirits market. Therefore, we
 would like to compare the welfare properties of the actual configuration with the
 properties of a private entry configuration of the predicted size.
 Privatized free entry with competitive daily fixed costs of $549—and retaining
 the current liquor tax—gives rise to a system with 1,290 stores. Consumption is
 301,172 bottles per day, nearly one-fifth above its current level. Consumer surplus
 is $10.78 million per day, while private profit is $0.25 million per day, positive only
 because of integer constraints. Daily liquor tax revenue is $0.57 million, and there is
 no labor surplus. Total producer surplus is thus $0.82 million per day. That is, priva
 tization that retains the current liquor tax would increase overall surplus relative to
 its PLCB level by 4.6 percent of consumer expenditure: consumers would gain by
 having more stores, while workers would lose their above-competitive payments.
 The free entry configuration has significant duplication: the 1,290 stores operate in
 only 1,112 distinct locations (tracts). Locations with sufficient equilibrium demand
 to cover the costs of multiple stores get more than one.
 We cannot directly choose the number of stores operating for our free entry algo
 rithm. Instead, to use our model to generate a Pennsylvania more closely resembling
 a private state, we adjust the fixed-cost threshold that determines entry and use the
 algorithm to calculate the number of stores that can be sustained at that cost. The
 fixed-cost threshold can also be expressed in terms of number of bottles sold per
 day, with entering firms selling daily quantities in excess of the ratio of fixed costs to
 variable profit per bottle (excluding liquor taxes). After experimenting, we find that
 a bottle threshold of 145 produces a private entry configuration with 1,527 stores in
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 1,177 distinct tracts.26 If Pennsylvania's liquor tax fell to the average level of other
 states, variable profit per bottle would rise to $4.26; hence, store operation costs
 of $618 would give this threshold (618/4.26= 145). We interpret the excess of
 this $618 over competitive costs of $549 as the cost of having a liquor license, and
 the payment for the license is part of the fixed cost from operating a store.27 In the
 resulting configuration, bottle consumption is 303,192 per day, again about one-fifth
 above its current level; and consumer surplus is $10.80 million. The system generates
 $0.34 million in private profit, $0.25 million in daily liquor tax, $0.11 million in daily
 license rents, and no labor surplus. Total producer rents are $0.70 million per day.
 Relative to either Pennsylvania privatization retaining the current liquor tax or
 reducing it to typical private state levels, the PLCB system has three major effects.
 First, the PLCB substantially limits the number of stores, to 621 rather than 1,500
 or more. This limitation on the number of stores reduces consumer surplus by about
 $0.3 million per day, but it also raises total producer surplus. Second, the PLCB
 reduces consumption by about 15 percent. Third, the PLCB delivers a substantial
 labor surplus that would not exist with a private system. Aggregate welfare is lower
 by about 5 percent of expenditure under the PLCB to its value under the two forms
 of free entry considered here.
 V. Comparison with Optimal Configurations and Implicit Motives
 Given an objective for the planner and an assumption about store operation
 costs, we can also use our model to calculate the optimal Pennsylvania liquor store
 configuration. We are interested primarily in statewide estimates. As discussed in
 Section III, however, we are able to calculate exact solutions only for smaller pieces
 of geography (individual counties) and aggregate them to the whole state or employ
 a simplified algorithm for the whole state. To compare the performance of these
 two algorithms, we first derive profit- and welfare-maximizing benchmark con
 figurations for counties, calculated both exactly and using the simplified statewide
 algorithm. We then redo this exercise at the state level, before turning to alternative
 planner objectives and assessing the PLCB relative to these objectives.
 A. Exact County Estimates
 At the county level, we can implement the integer programming approach to find
 efficient configurations. We derive optimal configurations under profit and welfare
 maximization, assuming the fixed store operating costs stay at current levels. We do
 this for five counties, and the leftmost columns of Table 5 summarize the exact welfare
 maximizing solution. The rightmost columns in Table 5 repeat the exercise using the
 26 Performing a grid search over values of the bottle threshold to find the exact threshold that entails the predicted
 size of the Pennsylvania liquor market from Section I is computationally taxing. We therefore rely on the free entry
 configuration resulting from the threshold of 145 bottles as an approximation.
 27 Under the competitive cost assumption, the additional payment for the liquor license is $69 per day. On an
 annual basis, this implies a payment of roughly $20,000. Discounting at 5-10 percent, this implies that the value of
 a liquor license is between $200,000 and $400,000. To get a sense of whether this implied license value is reason
 able, we analyzed the listings of 51 liquor stores for sale (outside of Pennsylvania) at http://www.bizbuysell.com/
 liquor-stores-for-sale/ as of December 19, 2011. Removing the stated value of included fixtures, inventory, and real
 estate, the mean (median) asking price was $473,294 ($240,000).
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 Table 5—Performance of Myopic Algorithm: Comparison of
 Welfare-Maximizing Configuration for Five Counties
 County Number of stores Net welfare Bottles sold Profit Net welfare deviation
 Panel A. Exact equilibrium configuration
 Berks 22 341,055 8,772 20,055
 Blair 5 112,859 2,167 5,435
 Lancaster 20 406,433 9,130 24,090
 Lycoming 6 102,885 2,072 3,843
 Schuylkill 10 142,324 2,932 3,766
 Panel B. Sequential myopic entry configuration
 Berks 21 340,977 8,668 20,637 -0.02%
 Blair 5 112,791 2,161 5,405 -0.06%
 Lancaster 21 405,455 9,141 23,033 —0.24%
 Lycoming 6 102,529 2,040 3,682 —0.35%
 Schuylkill 10 142,324 2,932 3,766 0%
 Note: Net welfare deviations are calculated as the percentage change in welfare in going from the welfare under
 the welfare-maximizing configuration to the welfare under the configuration predicted by the myopic algorithm to
 maximize welfare.
 sequential myopic entry algorithm for each county. The results are similar: the maxi
 mum welfare under the myopic algorithm is within 0.5 percent for all five counties.
 The comparison of the profit maximizing configurations yields comparable results.
 B. Statewide Estimates
 We now apply the two solution methods to calculating statewide efficient con
 figurations, aggregating across counties in the case of the county-by-county efficient
 ("exact county") configurations. We begin by assuming that the true store operation
 cost is the competitive cost of $549 per day and that, from the planner's perspective,
 the entire $5.07 in gross variable profit, including taxes, contributes to its profit. We
 contrast profit- and welfare-maximizing configurations under the exact county and
 the SME approaches. Table 6 reports the profit- and welfare-maximizing configu
 rations from these respective approaches, and the welfare properties of the results
 are similar. While the welfare- and profit-maximizing configurations from the two
 approaches differ in size by 0.4 and 4 percent, respectively, the associated sales
 and welfare measures are within 0.5 percent of each other. In both cases, welfare
 maximization is achieved with a store network of approximately 1,120 stores. Profit
 maximization is accomplished with around 480 stores. In what follows, we focus on
 the aggregation of the less computationally costly county-by-county exact results.
 In the analyses so far, we derived the benchmark configurations that maximize
 profit and welfare. A range of efficient configurations results, however, if we consider
 that the state maximizes a weighted sum of profit (variable profit less store operation
 costs) and consumer surplus. That is, the state's objective function W = PS + 7CS,
 where 7 is the weight that the planner attaches to consumer surplus relative producer
 surplus.28 When 7 = 0, this is simply profit maximization; when 7=1, this yields
 welfare maximization (equal weights on profit and consumer surplus).
 28 Our trade-off between consumer surplus and profit is reminiscent of the framework employed in Armstrong,
 Cowan, and Vickers (1994).
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 Table 6—Comparison of Exact County and SME Algorithms: Statewide Estimates
 Solution  Number of  Bottles  Consumer  Total producer  Total
 Configuration  algorithm  stores  sold  surplus  rents  surplus
 Welfare max N  Exact county  1,124  315,017  10,873  980  11,853
 SME  1,120  314,806  10,872  981  11,853
 Profit maximizing N  Exact county  492  269,985  10,586  1,099  11,685
 SME  473  268,924  10,579  1,104  11,682
 Notes: Consumer surplus, total producer rents, and total surplus reported in thousands. Fixed costs set to com
 petitive level of $549. Producer rents calculated as the sum of variable profit including taxes, less the total store
 operating costs.
 The term 7 is the planner's willingness to trade off CS for PS, and it has a natural
 interpretation. By choosing different store configurations, the planner can generate a
 range of consumer and producer surplus. Initially, for small networks, both CS and
 PS rise when comparing a network with n stores to a network with (n — 1 ) stores
 until the network size reaches the profit-maximizing monopoly configuration. As
 stores continue to be added, CS rises and PS falls. The ensuing relationship between
 CS and PS is a welfare possibilities frontier. When we observe a chosen store con
 figuration, we can use this Pareto frontier of profit and consumer surplus combina
 tions to infer the planner's trade-off between the two.
 Calculating the frontier requires an assumption about the store operation cost fac
 ing the planner. One interpretation of the PLCB's current supercompetitive store
 operation cost is that the PLCB actually faces this cost as a constraint. A second
 interpretation is that the planner faces competitive costs but chooses to make higher
 store operation payments as a means of sharing profit with labor. These contrasting
 assumptions give rise to different welfare frontiers and therefore different interpre
 tations of the system's current size.
 We derive the Pareto frontier under competitive costs by calculating optimal store
 configurations and their welfare properties for a range of 7s between 0 and 3.5.
 Figure 3 depicts the resulting Pareto frontier, starting with the profit-maximizing
 network size; Table 7 details the welfare- and profit-maximizing configurations con
 tained in the frontier. It is interesting to note that the welfare-maximizing configu
 ration, at 1,124 stores, is substantially smaller than the configurations that would
 likely obtain absent the current PLCB system. It also seems clear that welfare maxi
 mization with competitive costs—and treating the gross variable profits as profit—is
 a poor positive description of the current system.
 We can also create a Pareto frontier based on current store operation costs
 (FC = $1,110). With this higher cost, pure welfare maximization is achieved with
 566 stores, while profit maximization is accomplished with 249 stores. Competitive
 wages, holding current employment levels constant, imply that profit maximization
 is achieved with 370 stores, while 883 are required for welfare maximization.
 The Pareto frontiers provide a lens for viewing the current system size of 621. In
 the case of competitive costs, the point on the frontier corresponding to an efficient
 configuration with N = 621 is achieved by maximizing PS -f 0.18 x CS. Thus, the
 current system size would result from maximization by a planner who values profits
 5.6 times more than consumer surplus and shares some of the gross profits with
 labor. In other words, pure profit maximization with competitive costs provides a
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 rough characterization of the current system size. By contrast, using a Pareto frontier
 based on current costs, an efficient system of current size is achieved by maximizing
 PS + 1.17 x CS. That is, a planner facing current costs and seeking to maximize
 welfare would choose a system of roughly the current size.
 Yet both of these characterizations, based entirely on the number of stores operat
 ing, are incomplete. The profit- or welfare-maximizing configurations in Table 7 are
 those that lie on the Pareto frontier of efficient configurations. If the actual system
 were on the frontier, we could infer state motives from the frontier's slope. For exam
 ple, a system maximizing producer surplus would indicate a disregard for consumers.
 But the actual system is well inside the efficient frontiers, forgoing 8.7 percent and
 7.1 percent in welfare relative to the welfare-maximizing configuration under current
 costs and the profit-maximizing configuration under competitive costs.
 A second informative comparison to the efficient frontier is thus one where we
 compare the actual system to an efficient system of equal size. Based on both the
 myopic and the exact county algorithms, the efficient system with 621 stores gener
 ates CS of $10.32 million per day and profit of $1.09 million. Relative to the opti
 mal system of equal size, the actual system forgoes $0.18 million, or 5.3 percent of
 expenditure, in daily CS and $0.13 in daily profit. Consumption declines by 10 per
 cent, as Table 7 shows.29 The fact that the actual system is interior to the Pareto
 frontier suggests that the system's store configuration is not simply maximizing a
 weighted sum of producer and consumer surplus.30 We turn to this question below,
 with an attempt to infer system motives.
 Because the simulations in this section rest on a number of inputs, we explored
 the sensitivity of our results to some of our assumptions. First, we consider a setup
 29 The amounts of CS and profit forgone are similar when we compare the actual configuration to one where we
 constrain the size to be the number of distinct locations the PLCB serves, or 603 locations.
 30We say "suggests" rather than "indicates" because the actual system's distance to the Pareto frontier may also
 arise from model misspecification.
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 where the rental expense contribution to store operating costs is allowed to vary
 with tract-level residential rents. The resulting configuration generates a welfare
 improvement over the actual configuration whose magnitude is within 0.1 per
 centage points from the welfare differences under the constant-cost specification.
 Second, to investigate whether dynamic adjustment costs to changing the store con
 figuration, such as long-term leases, can explain the apparent locational inefficien
 cies, we use 1990 demographic data to predict the optimal store configuration at that
 time and compare it to the current configuration. The analysis provides little support
 for this explanation. Third, a closely related demand model to our main specification
 finds that our results are robust to the use of the different distance metrics depicted
 in columns 1-3 of Table 3. Last, we investigated the sensitivity of our results to
 the chosen demand specification. We re-derived the welfare- and profit-maximizing
 configurations using an alternative demand specification that entailed an economi
 cally low travel cost of only 20 cents. While the optimal configurations under this
 demand system are 20 to 35 percent smaller in size than the ones in Table 7, the
 majority of welfare losses continue to stem from locational inefficiencies. Online
 Appendix C provides additional detail.
 The model allows us one more exercise of interest, quantification of the welfare
 loss associated with free entry and a division of this loss into two parts: the overall
 loss from having too many stores in the wrong locations and the loss from having
 simply the wrong locations, for a given number of stores. We do this by compar
 ing a welfare-maximizing configuration to a free entry configuration with an equal
 number of stores. One complication is that we cannot easily target a particular con
 figuration size with free entry. But we can compare the free entry configurations in
 Table 4 with equal-sized efficient configurations.
 A "fair" comparison of welfare maximization and free entry requires us to calculate
 profits analogously under both entry regimes. For welfare maximization we treat the
 entire gross variable profit per bottle as profit. Hence, we need to do the same for free
 entry. The ensuing free entry configuration, without any liquor tax, is thus useful as an
 evaluation of free entry, but it is not meant as a plausible characterization of a private
 liquor retailing system. The resulting free entry configuration has 2,230 stores. Daily
 consumption is 322,197 bottles, consumer surplus is high at $10.92 million per day,
 and profit is low: $0.41 million per day. Relative to the welfare-maximizing configura
 tion (with 1,124) stores, free entry raises CS by $0.05 million and reduces profits by
 $0.57 million. Overall, free entry dissipates $0.52 million per day.
 The theoretically familiar welfare loss from free entry with homogeneous goods
 (Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) arises entirely from too many
 outlets. Here, where goods are distinguished by location, we are able to ask how much
 of this lost welfare is due purely to wrong locations as opposed to too many loca
 tions. To answer this, we compare a free entry configuration with a given number of
 stores against a frontier configuration of equal size (see the bottom panel of Figure
 3). We perform this comparison for both N = 1,124 (the size of our welfare maximiz
 ing configuration) and N = 2,230 (the result of unconstrained free entry). We calcu
 late the efficient 2,230-store configuration via our SME algorithm (see Table 7), and
 by experimentation with different bottle thresholds we determine a 1,130-store free
 entry configuration, reported in Table 4. At /V = 2,230, the aggregate welfare loss from
 wrong locations is $0.27 million, while the loss in the neighborhood of N = 1,124 is
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 $0.3 million. These losses are between 52 percent and 57 percent of the overall wel
 fare loss from free entry in this context. Hence, half of the loss from free entry in this
 context would arise from wrong locations; the other half would arise from too many
 stores. Our modeling setup is unusual in that we fix prices despite free entry. This
 feature will tend to increase the overall and locational welfare losses from free entry
 as incentives to enter remain artificially as entry occurs.
 C. Deviations from Efficiency Implicit in Free Entry and the Actual System
 We saw above that the actual system is interior to the Pareto frontier. This sub
 optimality can arise because the system's store configuration favors some types of
 consumers over others. We can explore the nature of this favoritism using the dis
 tance between each tract and the nearest store. We would not expect these distances
 to be equal across tracts in an efficient system; rather, the distance to the nearest
 store in an efficient (on-the-frontier) configuration provides a benchmark measure
 of the efficient distance for consumers to their nearest liquor store. Define d* as the
 distance between tract t and its nearest store in an efficient configuration, d', E as the
 distance to the nearest store in a free entry configuration, and d^" B as the distance to
 the tract containing the nearest actual store. We can compare d'¡E — d* across tracts
 with different characteristics to infer how atomistic free entrants regard different
 types of consumers. Similar analysis of d'¡LCB — d* reveals the goals of the implicit
 PLCB planner. We compare configurations of equal size—the size of the PLCB
 system of 621 stores—to isolate the pure impact of entry rationale.
 Free entry is well understood to foster potentially excessive entry in high-demand
 areas and to effect inefficiently insufficient entry in low-demand areas (Spence 1976).
 By contrast, a major ostensible PLCB goal is to offer service to Pennsylvania con
 sumers located throughout the state, even if they live in remote locations. We would
 therefore expect free entry to deviate from an efficient configuration by favoring urban
 consumers and for the PLCB's chosen locations to reverse this market bias.
 As Table 8 shows, a regression of dEE — d* on the tract's rural population
 share along with tract median income produces a coefficient of 8.12 (Standard
 Error = 0.32) on the rural share, indicating that in a 100 percent rural tract, the
 nearest liquor store is 8.12 kilometers more distant under free entry than in an
 equal-sized efficient configuration.31 The coefficient on median income is nega
 tive, indicating that high-income tracts are closer to liquor stores under free entry,
 compared with the optimum. This confirms the free entry bias against low-demand
 areas. An analogous regression of dptLCB — d* on the rural share produces a coef
 ficient of 1.87 (Standard Error = 0.20), while the median income coefficient goes
 from —0.05 to 0.01. As under free entry, the rural coefficient indicates a bias
 against rural consumers relative to the efficient configuration of equal size. The
 coefficient is less than a quarter as large, however, indicating that the PLCB's
 configuration substantially mitigates the bias against rural consumers implicit in
 the free entry configuration equal in size to the actual configuration.
 3'The analogous regression based on the 1,588-store free entry configuration produces a rural share coefficient
 of 2.17 (SE = 0.17).
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 Table 8—Distance Traveled: Actual and Free Entry versus Optimal Configurations
 df™ - d;  a  1  a
 (i)  (2)
 Rural Share  1.873***  8.122***
 0.196  0.320
 Median income (000)  0.012***  -0.045***
 0.004  0.006
 Constant  -0.630***  2.225***
 0.177  0.289
 Observations  3,123  3,123
 R2  0.03  0.18
 Note: Dependent variables defined in text.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 "Significant at the 5 percent level.
 D. Direct Evidence of Politics
 The PLCB is ultimately controlled by the Pennsylvania General Assembly, and
 there is speculation in the press that political considerations and lobbying play a
 significant role in store closings, countering the stated profit motives of the board.32
 Here we thus ask whether the PLCB's entry patterns reflect its political control.
 Oversight of the PLCB rests with the House Committee on Liquor Control, whose
 membership numbers 28 among the 203 General Assembly overall. In the 2005
 2006 Session, the Liquor Control committee was in Republican control.33
 We can locate each liquor store in its House and Senate district.34 Of 203 districts, 198
 contained a liquor store as of the end (start) of 2005 ( 198/203). Districts represented by
 Democrats have slightly more stores, although this difference is not significant. Of the
 175 districts whose representatives did not serve on the Liquor Control committee, 97
 percent had a store. All 28 of the Liquor Control committee member-represented dis
 tricts had a store, although this difference is not statistically significant (p- value = 0.37).
 We explore this more systematically by regressing the number of liquor stores in a
 House district on population, median income, percent rural, and percent black, using
 the years 2000-2005. When we include all years but do not include district fixed
 effects, then after accounting for demographic characteristics of districts, those rep
 resented by a Democrat have 0.86 additional stores, while those represented by a
 32 According to the January 1, 2008 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article, "LCB works in curious ways" (http://www.
 post-gazette.com/pg/08028/852743-85.stm, accessed October 17, 2008), then-PLCB chairman Stapleton "did
 allow that the board hears from legislators 'all the time' when a store closing or store transfer is in the works. 'A
 lot of times there is a strong belief by legislators that certain downtown areas should be served by a store,' he said."
 The article cites the example of Representative C. George, who "has been an outspoken advocate for state stores in
 his district... [including] the store in Houtzdale, Mr. George's hometown, [that] has lost from $ 11.000 to $20,000
 in each of the past three years, but, he vowed, 'I would fight tooth and nail against any plan that took that store out
 of our town.' "
 33The committee had the following structure: a chair from each of the majority (Republican) and minority
 (Democratic) parties, four chairs of two subcommittees drawn from the two parties, a secretary drawn from each
 party, as well as 12 rank-and-file Republicans and 8 rank-and-file Democrats. We located stores in districts using
 the Find Your Legislator feature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania website. See "Standing Committees of the
 House of Representatives, 2005-2006 Session."
 34 See http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/findyourlegislator/index.cfm?CFID=25192954&CFTOKEN
 =16631361, last accessed August 29, 2011.
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 Liquor Control committee member do not have more stores. Distinguishing Liquor
 Control committee members by party reveals a different pattern: districts repre
 sented by a Democrat on the Liquor Control committee have 0.6 fewer stores, while
 those represented by a Republican Liquor Control committee member have 0.5 more
 stores. When we include district fixed effects, however, member party becomes
 insignificant, while committee membership now has a significant coefficient of 0.2.
 When committee membership's effect is allowed to vary by party, the minority party
 effect disappears, while the majority party (Republican) impact remains significant
 (0.3 additional stores). Online Appendix Table A2 contains detailed results. Overall,
 there is only modest evidence of a political impact on store location decisions.35
 VI. Conclusion
 The PLCB's retailing system provides a rare glimpse into government decisions
 about entry. Comparisons with other states indicate that states with private liquor
 retailing have lower labor costs and substantially more stores per capita. How does
 government operation affect outcomes? Under a private system, Pennsylvania would
 likely have 2.5 times as many stores. Using a simple spatial demand model, we are
 able to compare the current system to plausible free entry configurations. The plau
 sible counterfactual configuration would raise consumer surplus by 9 percent of cur
 rent consumer expenditure, simply because more consumers would have a closer
 store. Privatization would have two distinct effects on the rents enjoyed by produc
 ers. First, with more stores operating, overall producer surplus would fall. But paying
 Pennsylvania liquor store employees at private state rates would eliminate the rents
 currently experienced by PLCB employees. A significant welfare aspect of privatiza
 tion is thus pure redistribution as aggregate welfare increases by only 4.6 percent.
 Based on the number of stores it operates, what is the PLCB currently doing in
 relation to theoretical benchmarks of welfare and profit maximization? If the plan
 ner faced competitive store operation costs, it would maximize welfare with nearly
 double the current number of stores. One can roughly rationalize the current config
 uration as welfare-maximizing, if one takes the current supercompetitive store oper
 ation costs as given. Alternatively, the current system is similar in size to a system
 that would maximize profits for a planner facing competitive costs and sharing some
 of the profits with employees. But the PLCB configuration is well below the con
 sumer surplus-profit Pareto frontier, indicating that the implicit planner cares about
 something other than simply a weighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. While
 we cannot uniquely identify the motives of the planner, we find that the PLCB's
 choices serve to mitigate—but not eliminate—the bias of free entry against rural
 consumers. Satisfying political goals could be a further motive of the system, but we
 find little evidence of explicit political influence on store locations.
 According to our estimates, the PLCB's choice to reduce the number of stores
 operating also reduces consumption by 15 percent. Because the consumption of
 alcohol creates substantial social costs for third parties, consumer surplus alone is an
 35 We also investigated possible political influence on the 2005 choice of which stores would operate on Sundays.
 Sunday store presence is systematically more likely in higher-income House districts, but political variables are not
 systematically related.
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 inadequate measure of consumption's impact. For example, Young and Bielinska
 Kwapisz (2006) document an elasticity of 1.13 of traffic fatalities with respect to
 aggregate statewide alcohol consumption. Cook, Osterman, and Sloan (2005) find a
 0.23 all-cause elasticity of mortality with respect to statewide alcohol consumption.
 While alcohol consumption could be controlled without state operation of liquor
 retailing—for example, with strict entry regulation or high taxes—the PLCB's
 effective discouragement of alcohol consumption reduces social costs, and these
 effects may represent additional motives of the PLCB.
 We have one other novel finding on the welfare loss from free entry. Usual esti
 mates of the welfare loss from free entry are driven by the number of outlets. We
 are able to estimate the welfare losses from free entry arising from both the wrong
 number of stores and the wrong locations for stores. In our context, wrong locations
 alone produce half of this loss.
 Our analysis has focused on the store location and network size considerations
 of a public versus a private system. In doing so, we abstract from other strategic
 choices. It should be noted again that the simulations in the paper take prices as
 given. We further treat stores as identical in selection and abstract from system
 atic differences between stores that would encourage consumers to patronize stores
 further afield than their closest. These choices are motivated in part by lack of sys
 tematic data on prices and variety choices by retailers in private states; we leave the
 comparison of product selection under the government system to what might result
 in a private Pennsylvania system to future research.
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